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Discontinuities and Singularities, Data and Phenomena: For Referentialism 
 
The main aim of this paper is to delineate and evaluate two rival positions in the ongoing 
debate prompted by the employment of infinite idealizations in the treatment of phase 
transitions. According to the reconstruction of the debate proposed here, the key-disagreement 
between these two camps revolves around their understanding of a couple of technical 
notions. The central one is that of a discontinuity of a thermodynamical parameter (such as 
volume or entropy); a closely related notion is that of a singularity of a thermodynamical 
potential (a ‘free energy’ function). Another notion – and what, in fact, ignited the debate – is 
the role played (if any) by an infinite (statistical mechanical) system. The dispute is between 
what I shall label here ‘Referentialism’, roughly, the claim that discontinuities and 
singularities do refer to features of thermal systems, and its challengers, the non-
Referentialists, who take the opposite view.1 A more detailed account of these notions and 
positions will be provided below. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I will spell out these three notions in 
significantly more technical detail than has been done in the philosophical literature so far. I 
do this for a philosophical purpose, which I take up in sections 2 and 3: to pin down what, 
exactly, is at stake between Referentialists and their opponents. The two tasks are related, 
since I suspect that the lack of clarity in the philosophical discussion is due precisely to the 
absence of a careful parsing of the relevant physics. Then, as I said, in sections 2 and 3 I will 
draw on these (non-trivial) details and comment on the viability of these rival positions. In 
essence, I argue that although Referentialism encounters some problems (it turns out not to be 
a unitary thesis), it survives unscathed by the objections raised against it by its opponents. An 
important element on which my overall argument relies is the distinction between data and 
phenomena, as introduced by Bogen and Woodward (1988). 
 
In slightly more detail, the line of thinking I pursue here is to show that the non-Referentialist 
criticism is misguided, in two respects. First, in section 2, I articulate a rebuttal of this 
criticism, based on an analysis of what the Referentialists (following the physicists) mean by a 
‘discontinuity’. I maintain that what they say is entirely uncontentious, and has virtually no 
bearing on any ontological-metaphysical thesis about the constitution of reality (in particular, 
is entirely consistent with the atomic theory of matter). Second, in section 3, I make a more 
constructive point (in favor of Referentialism), by appealing to the data-phenomena 
distinction. I sketch a proposal meant to show how singularities are referential. The key-idea 
is that they should be understood as referring to, or as ‘picking out’, the very phenomenon of a 
phase change – where (following Bogen and Woodward) a phenomenon is a real, genuine 
constituent of the world, generating (unavoidably scattered) data-points when observed via 
instruments. As we will see, the key to disentangling the various issues here is to carefully 
distinguish between singular mathematical points, appearing when we introduce a certain 
formalism (of free energy), and clusters of measured data-points, which come out of the 
laboratories. 
 
                                                          
1 Although irrelevant for the actual content of the discussion here, authors and specific papers can be assigned to 
each side of the debate (under the usual caveat that they may not agree with this categorization). Thus, 
Batterman’s (2001; 2005; 2006; 2010; 2016) are illustrative for Referentialism, and similar sympathies can be 
detected in Morrison’s (2012; 2014) and Bangu (2009; 2015, forthcoming). As for the other camp, I will be 
discussing mainly Norton (2012), and Menon and Callender (2013), as well as gesturing in passing to Butterfield 





The following phase-diagram is the typical starting-point in the thermodynamical 
treatment of the phase transitions.2 (The statistical-mechanical treatment follows later on.) 
 
Fig. 1. A phase diagram for water. 
Consider a possible system described in Fig. 1 – say, a certain amount of water filling up a 
glass cylinder with a piston on top.3 The two control parameters are the pressure P in the 
cylinder, and the temperature T. Point O is the ‘triple’ point (there the water is in all three 
phases simultaneously). State C represents the ‘critical’ point; above it, we cannot talk of 
liquid or gaseous states, but of a (supercritical) fluid state. As is clear from Fig. 1, a phase 
change can be initiated along the line L-B-J as follows. At L, we supply, quasi-statically, heat 
at constant pressure. The increase in temperature takes us toward point B on OC. Upon 
reaching B, the temperature of the system remains constant for a while, while the system 
keeps absorbing heat. Thus, such an L-B-J transition needs ‘latent heat’ to happen. Note that 
although the state B of the system is represented as a (mathematical) point, this does not mean 
that the transition (the crossing of OC) is instantaneous, or even very fast; when the system is 
at B, gaseous bubbles begin to form in the cylinder. At B, when the pressure of these vapors 
equals the pressure of the water in the cylinder, the system has reached its (so-called) 
‘boiling’ point, i.e., the boiling temperature TB corresponding to a certain value of the 
pressure. Now the gaseous phase coexists with the liquid phase inside the cylinder. 
 
In order to make the system move out of state B, and complete the transition at constant 
pressure, we have to keep heating it. After a while, the system’s temperature begins to 
increase and the system moves out of B passing on to the other side of OC, going toward J. 
Once the system leaves B, there is no liquid water in the cylinder; it has all turned into vapors 
and, as we keep heating the cylinder, the temperature of these vapors increases as the system 
moves toward J. (One also notices that the vapors absorb heat at a different rate than the 
                                                          
2 Except for emphasizing certain aspects of these phenomena, the presentation and the diagrams follow the 
textbook treatment (e.g., Zemansky and Dittman (1997)). Section 2 and the diagrams draw on my xxxx 
(forthcoming).  
3 The graph is a projection of the complete three-dimensional phase diagram, also including a volume axis V, 
onto the P-T plane. 
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liquid). The transition took place at constant pressure; however, the piston was pushed up, so 
the volume has increased. Thus, the density of the substance in the cylinder – now, vapors – 
has dropped massively. 
 
Let us focus on the volume now. It undergoes a change: it had a certain value at the 
beginning, right when the system entered state B. Then, after the piston moved up and the 
system (only vapors now) left B, the volume reads a higher value. The difference between the 
two values of the volume is the reason why the physicists say that at B, the transition point in 
the diagram, the volume undergoes a discontinuity. An L-B-J transition like this one is then 
(fittingly) called ‘discontinuous’ – and also ‘first order’ (we will see below why). There are 
other parameters of the system, such as its entropy S, that behave in a similar fashion. They 
are ‘discontinuous’ too, having one value at the beginning of the transition and another value 
at the end (while the system is still in state B). 
 
Before we move on, let us note in passing that another kind of transition from one equilibrium 
phase to another is possible. Suppose we go along path LJ again, only this time toward the 
critical point C (by first gradually increasing both the pressure and the temperature, then 
decreasing them both to reach J again.) The important novelty is that at, and near, C, the 
liquid and gaseous phases are virtually indistinguishable – and not coexistent, as in the case of 
the previous transition happening at B. At (and above) C, the water in the cylinder manifests 
‘critical opalescence’ (it becomes milky and cloudy), and the ‘signature’ of the phase change 
is now given by other parameters becoming discontinuous, such as the heat capacity (some 
parameters diverge, i.e., become infinite). A system transitioning from one equilibrium phase 
to another in this way is said to undergo a ‘continuous’ phase change. (There’s no latent heat 
needed to complete the transition, so the halting noticed in the L-B-J process does not occur.) 
These continuous phase changes and, more generally, the phenomena taking place ‘at 
criticality’, will be left out of this discussion. 
 
In order to characterize the L-B-J types of transitions within thermodynamics, we need to 
introduce another important concept, that of ‘free energy’, a (so-called) thermodynamic 
‘potential’. (There are in fact two free energies, A and G, ‘Helmholtz’ and ‘Gibbs’, defined, 
respectively, as A = U – TS and G = H – TS, where U is the internal energy of the system, H 
is its enthalpy = U + PV, T the absolute temperature, and S the entropy.) 
 
Now, let us consider the two equilibrium phases independently. A free energy function, for 
liquid and gaseous phases is represented in Fig. 2 as the segments D(K)E and F(K)N, 
respectively. Considered separately, each is well defined and has continuous derivatives at 
every point, including K. (The shapes of G and A are roughly the same when plotted against 






Fig. 2. Free energy plotted against temperature 
 
Now consider the manipulation of a system shown in Fig. 2. Only the thick, un-dotted lines 
have physical significance. We start at D, in the liquid phase, and increase the temperature 
while keeping the pressure constant. The passage from the liquid phase to the vapor phase 
takes place at K. When entering K, the liquid phase has a certain volume. Here, the free 
energy function, characterizing the liquid phase (the segment DK) does not continue smoothly 
into the dotted segment KE. Instead, it switches to the other free energy function, the segment 
KN, which characterizes the vapor phase. When exiting K, the volume (now of vapors) 
occupied is larger than the volume occupied when the substance entered K. Once again, 
although K is represented as a mathematical point, this switch is not instantaneous, or even 
extremely fast, as the system spends time at K; this state corresponds to state B in Fig. 1. 
 
From a purely mathematical perspective, we see that as the system passes through K, the 
tangent (first derivative) of DE at K (tDE in Fig. 2) changes into tFN, the tangent of FN at K. We 
are now in the realm of mathematical abstraction and this change is indeed ‘sudden’. Thus, if 
we take the whole path DN to represent the free energy function for the system undergoing an 
evolution from state D to state N, to say that it is not smooth at point K is to say that this 
function has two (first) derivatives associated with it. Point K is thus a ‘kink’, a sharp turn – 
mathematically, it is a point where the free energy function of the system is in fact not 
differentiable, or non-analytic. Equivalently, point K is a ‘singularity’, since there the 
curvature of the free energy is infinite. 
 
Moreover, mathematically speaking, since A = U – TS and G = H – TS, then S = − (∂A/∂T )V 
and V = (∂G/∂P)T. These discontinuities of entropy and volume now correspond to the 
mathematically discontinuous change of the first derivatives at K (in Fig. 2). Fig. 3 below 







Several clarifications about Fig. 3 are needed. The singularities of the free energies (shown in 
(a) and (b)) correspond to discontinuities of the entropy and volume (shown in (c) and (d)). 
The entropy discontinuity (in (c)) gives the amount of latent heat TB ∆S. The dotted segments 
in (a) and (b) correspond to the dotted segments in Fig 2, where the system is in meta-stable 
states. 
 
The introduction of the notion of free energy allows the following characterization of a L-B-J 
phase transition between two equilibrium phases. Such a transition occurs when certain 
parameters, such as volume (or entropy), exhibit discontinuities – or, since these parameters 
are also the first-order derivatives of the free energy, when such derivatives are discontinuous 
as explained in Fig. 2; equivalently, such a transition occurs when free energy has a non-
analytic point.4 
 
At this moment, the thermodynamical treatment of the discontinuous (first-order) phase 
changes is (almost) complete. Yet, before we look at the statistical mechanical treatment of 
such a phase change, let me clarify that the description I provided so far mixed, for the 
purpose of streamlining the presentation, an idealized thermodynamic description, on one 
hand, and the description of some experimental procedures, on the other. Thus, there are 
features that are ignored in this mixed description. For one thing, heating (at finite rate) does 
not exactly produce an equilibrium; for another, temperature has limited precision in a finite-
size system, volume fluctuations will occur, and the temperature of the phase transition cannot 
be specified with infinite precision in the experiment – in particular, point B is not really a 
                                                          
4 The current classification originates in, but refines, P. Ehrenfest’s: if the first-order derivative of the free energy 
is discontinuous, the transition is first-order (discontinuous). A transition is continuous when a second (or 




point from the experimental view. (All this will become clear later on, I hope, but placing the 
warning here is helpful.) 
 
Let us now move on to the statistical mechanical treatment of a phase change. This is 
important because the very raison d’etre for statistical mechanics was to provide an account 
of the macroscopic (thermodynamical) behavior in microscopic terms – under the assumption 
that thermodynamical systems (the water in the cylinder) is actually made of an enormous, but 
finite, number of molecules. Needless to say, the idea was (and is) an epochal success, and 
one – in fact the most important – concept ensuring the connection between the two levels is 
that of the (canonical) partition function Z, defined as Z =  ∑ 𝑒−𝐸𝑖/𝑘𝐵 𝑇𝑖 . It
5 is written in terms 
of Boltzmann’s constant kB and thus it is a micro-level notion. It assumes a (quantum) 
microscopic constitution of systems, being a sum over all the possible microstates of energy 
Ei. It also provides expressions for free energies (A and G), and thus links with all other 
macroscopic quantities, since they can be obtained by differentiation from the free energy (as 
we saw). One way to get the free energy from the partition function is as A = − kBT lnZ. 
 
Now, given this relation, we encounter an interesting puzzle. Mathematically, we see that a 
non-analyticity (singularity) of A (or G) is a non-analyticity of Z, but Z cannot harbor such 
singular points, since it is a finite sum of exponentials, and each of these is itself an analytic 
function, which means that Z itself is analytic. If we get back to Fig. 2, this is to say that one 
and the same Z cannot describe both phases. It thus looks like statistical mechanics is unable 
(in the strongest, mathematical, sense) to acknowledge the existence of phase transitions as 
they are described above (within thermodynamics) – a major problem for thermal physics.  
 
However, this is not what one finds in statistical mechanics textbooks (fortunately). The way 
around this problem relies on employing the following conceptual maneuver. First, consider 
an idealized version of the statistical mechanical system under scrutiny, a system composed of 
an infinite number of particles N (which occupies an infinite volume V, and has a finite 
density N/V.) For this infinite system – that is, obtained by taking the N → ∞ limit, or the 
‘thermodynamic limit’ – it has been proved that the existence of singularities is possible.6 As 
Ruelle explains:  
 
The physical systems to which the thermodynamic formalism applies are idealized to be actually 
infinite, i.e. to fill R𝜈 (where 𝜈 = 3 in the usual world). This idealization is necessary because only 
infinite systems exhibit sharp phase transitions. Much of the thermodynamic formalism is 
concerned with the study of states of infinite systems. (2004, 2) 
 
                                                          
5 A number of technicalities had to be left out of this presentation. Z is typically evaluated for a homogeneous 
system at fixed volume, but the discussion here involved a heterogeneous system, i.e., a system where liquid and 
gas coexist (at point B), and pressure instead of volume is the control parameter. Thus, a calculation of F from Z 
gives an unphysical function p (V, T) with an unstable region (see figure 8.6.2 in Reif (1965, 308)). In fact, the 
evaluation of the full partition function in these conditions does not yield the spontaneous symmetry-breaking 
characteristic for most phase transitions (as the analysis of the Ising model reveals for a magnetic system). So, to 
work with the appropriate partition function, one needs to confine the sum to only part of the state space (as well 
as make a few other further assumptions). 
6 More conditions have to be satisfied for the existence of the thermodynamic limit; see Liu (1999, S96); 
Goldenfeld (1992, 25-28) discusses examples where the limit does not exist. Sklar (1993, 78–81) lists several 
reasons why the limit is generally useful (e.g., it makes the effect of fluctuations vanish). The idea of such a limit 
was first proposed by H. Kramers, in the late 1930s. L. Onsager (1944) was able to show that an infinite 2-
dimensional Ising model undergoes a continuous phase transition (near criticality, the specific heat diverges 
logarithmically). Yang and Lee (1952) proved that the limit yields discontinuous transitions too (it generalizes to 
other types of transitions). 
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Let us take stock. Phase transitions of the L-B-J type (in Fig. 1) are characterized by the 
discontinuous behavior of certain parameters (such as the volume, as seen in Fig. 3(d)) – and 
it is this behavior that in fact suggests their label (‘discontinuous’ transitions). When we 
employ a more general mathematical representation in terms of free energy functions, these 
discontinuities are captured as singularities of these functions (as seen in Fig. 2 and Fig 3 (a), 
(b)). The behavior of the first derivatives of these free energies at such singular points is the 
source of the other label for these phenomena (‘first-order’ transitions). Once this macro-level 
thermodynamical mathematical description is imported within statistical mechanics, it turns 
out that the existence of such singularities can be exhibited only by an infinite system (i.e., in 






As introduced at the outset, the debate I will engage with here concerns what I called 
Referentialism – the idea, as Batterman puts it, that  
 
…phase transitions [are] real physical discontinuities and [thermodynamics] is correct to 
represent them mathematically as singularities. (2005, 234) 
 
I emphasized the word ‘real’ in this quote, since it marks the contentious element, to which 
the non-Referentialists reacted vigorously. One such well-known reaction is Norton’s: 
 
If the atomic theory of matter is true, then ordinary thermal systems of finitely many components 
cannot display discontinuous changes in their thermodynamic properties. The changes they 
manifest are merely so rapid as to be observationally indistinguishable from discontinuous 
behavior. Indeed, if we could establish that the phase transitions of real substances exhibit these 
discontinuities, we would have refuted the atomic theory of matter, which holds that ordinary 
thermal systems are composed of finitely many atoms, molecules, or components. (2012, 225) 
 
Real phase transitions cannot exhibit the discontinuities on pain of contradicting the atomic theory of 
matter, and, were the discontinuities established factually, the atomic theory would fall. (2012, 228)   
 
So, the concern here, and not only Norton’s, is prompted by the worry that Referentialism 
clashes with the atomic theory of matter.7 The reasoning in the quote above, otherwise valid (a 
modus tolens), goes as following. If such changes in the thermodynamics properties (e.g., the 
volume) are truly discontinuous (i.e., if the system somewhat ‘jumps’ from having one value 
for its volume to another value, if not instantly presumably very rapidly – see below), then the 
only way available for statistical mechanics to account for them is by assuming that the 
physical systems are composed of an infinite number of molecules. Since we cannot accept 
that (otherwise we would conflict with the atomic theory of matter), the antecedent has to be 
rejected (“ordinary thermal systems of finitely many components cannot display 
discontinuous changes in their thermodynamic properties”). This amounts to a rejection of 
Referentialism: ‘discontinuous change in a thermodynamic property’ (e.g., volume) has no 
referent in reality.  
 
An astute reader of the detailed presentation in section 2 has perhaps already spotted the 
problems with the argument in the quote above: not only is it incomplete, but it also departs 
from the way the Referentialists (following the physicists) use the notion of a ‘discontinuity’. 
                                                          




I will begin with some comments on this second point, although it is rather difficult to 
speculate on what non-Referentialists take a ‘discontinuity’ to be. From the quote above, it 
seems to correspond to an extremely “rapid” change, so fast that it is “observationally 
indistinguishable from discontinuous behavior”. To see that this is just not what a 
discontinuity is taken to be in this context in the thermodynamics textbooks, we have to recall 
the discussion of Fig. 3(d) above. We begin in the gas phase and increase pressure. The 
process takes place at a constant temperature. The volume decreases until it reaches the point 
marked as V2. At this moment, the substance in the cylinder is characterized by a certain 
value of the temperature, a certain pressure and volume (V2). Qualitatively, right before the 
system has volume V2, there are only vapors in the cylinder. The system keeps absorbing the 
heat we supply (such that the temperature remains constant), and what we observe next is that 
as the system leaves state V2, the vapors gradually turn into liquid; droplets form first, 
observable on the glass walls of the cylinder. This condensation process (at the micro-level 
also called ‘nucleation’) ends in the state where there is only liquid in the cylinder – this is the 
state of the system as it has volume V1. The temperature is kept constant during this time, and 
we soon notice that no matter how much we increase the pressure, this value V1 of the volume 
will not quite decrease any further – the compressibility of liquids is almost zero. During this 
process, physicists say that the system exhibits a discontinuity ‘in the volume’, in the precise 
sense that for a certain value of pressure and temperature, the substance in the cylinder starts 
by occupying a larger volume V2 and ends up by occupying a smaller one V1. This is then the 
precise sense in which one speaks of a discontinuity in this thermodynamic parameter 
(volume). As such, it is as real as anything can be in physics, and should cause no concern. 
 
I said that it is difficult to speculate about what may be responsible for the confusion here, but 
one possibility is that although we can unproblematically speak of a discontinuity in the 
volume, the non-Referentialists do not realize that the change itself, from one state (of volume 
V2) to another (of volume V1) does happen continuously – hence, once again, one should not 
be worried that atomism is in danger. In fact, the textbook description of this isothermic 
condensation process given by Reif (1965, 310) is explicit on this (my emphases): 
 
If under these circumstances a fraction ξ of the mole of substance is in the gaseous phase, then 
the total molar volume Vtot is given by 
 
Vtot = ξV2 + (1 – ξ)V1 
 
In the course of the phase transformation the total molar volume changes continuously from the 
value V2 for the gas to the value V1 for the liquid as the fraction ξ changes continuously from 1 
to 0. In this process there will, of course, be a change of entropy and an associated latent heat.8 
 
Let us now turn to Menon and Callender’s (2013, 215-6) discussion of the discontinuity issue. 
I find their presentation still somewhat ambiguous when it comes to what they take a 
discontinuity to be, and more generally on the distinction between discontinuities and 
singularities. 
 
The mere existence of distinct states of the system exhibiting these different magnitudes does not 
suggest that there is any discontinuity in the transition between the systems. This is a point about 
the mathematical representation, but the lesson extends to the physical phenomenon. While it is 
true that the phases of a system are macroscopically distinct, this is not sufficient to establish that 
the physical transition from one of these phases to the other as gross constraints are altered 
involves a physical discontinuity. 
                                                          




In order to see whether there really is a discontinuity that is appropriately modeled as a singularity 
we need to understand the dynamics of the change of phase. So we take a closer look at what 
happens at a first-order phase transition. Consider the standard representation of an isotherm on 
the liquid-gas P-V diagram at a phase transition (figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 P-V diagram for a liquid–gas system at a phase transition. 
 
The two black dots are coexistence points. At these points the pressure on the system is the same, 
but the system separates into two distinct phases: low-volume liquid and high-volume gas. The 
two coexistence points are connected by a horizontal tie-line or Maxwell plateau. On this plateau, 
the system exists as a two-phase mixture. It is here that the dynamics of interest takes place. 
However, the representation above is too coarse-grained to provide a full description of the 
behavior of the system at transition. This representation certainly involves a mathematical 
singularity: as the pressure is reduced, the volume of the system changes discontinuously. But a 
closer look at how the transition takes place demonstrates that this is just an artifact of the 
representation, and not an accurate picture of what is going on at the transition. The P-V diagram 
ignores fluctuations, but fluctuations are crucial to the transition between phases. The process by 
which this takes place is nucleation. When we increase the pressure of a gas above the coexistence 
point it does not instantaneously switch to a liquid phase. It continues in its gaseous phase, but 
this supersaturated vapor is meta-stable. (…)  
 
Perhaps the nucleation of droplets from zero radius could be seen as an example of a physical 
discontinuity. (2013, 216) 
 
What they write here leaves open what they deny: that a genuine discontinuity in the volume 
exists (Norton’s claim), or that the change takes place discontinuously. If the former, I am 
afraid that they are, as we saw, mistaken; if the latter, they are right, the change is continuous 
indeed. Although I am inclined to read the passage charitably, I should note that 
Referentialists have never said otherwise. Nor did they object to the idea that a process like 
nucleation takes place, at the microscopic level. In fact, it is hard to see why nucleation is 
brought in discussion here at all – and that it is makes one suspect that the above reading 
excessively charitable. If talking about nucleation is meant to provide – on the Referentialist’s 
behalf, as it were – an example of a genuine discontinuity (as if the one in the volume was not 
so), then this is beside the point: as we saw, this is simply not the sense in which the 
Referentialists use the notion. As we saw, these phase transitions are not called 
‘discontinuous’ for reasons having to do with nucleation. Sure, if one wishes to characterize 
the nucleation micro-process as ‘discontinuous’, one is, I suppose, free to do so, but this has 
virtually nothing to do with how the term is used by the Referentialist in this context in 
thermodynamics. These remarks also apply to the possible suggestion that when Norton talks 
about very “rapid” changes, he has in mind nucleation – since, indeed, nucleation is a very 
rapid process, of the order of 10-3 seconds; see Carpenter and Bahadur (2015) – but, again, 




This point links the discussion to another (correct) remark in the Menon and Callender 
account above, namely that the transition between the two states is not “instantaneous” (or “so 
rapid as to be observationally indistinguishable from discontinuous behavior”, as Norton 
described it.) After all, the relevant process essentially involves latent heat (something which 
neither Norton, nor Menon and Callender mention in their papers), and this is the reason why 
the issue of the rapidity of the process cannot even arise. 
 
Another aspect where both Norton’s and Menon and Callender’s accounts pose even more 
serious difficulties is the notion of a singularity. I mentioned as a shortcoming of Norton’s 
argument above that it is incomplete. This is so since it passes from the discontinuities to the 
introduction of infinite systems without mentioning the intermediate notion, the singularity – 
the mathematical representation of the physical discontinuity in the formalism of the free 
energies.9 As we recall, it is its presence in the partition function that is the essential element 
requiring the introduction of the infinite system. By not keeping track of the distinction, the 
objection he raises against Referentialism misses the point: while the discontinuities are 
trivially real (if we use the term carefully, and in line with its use in thermodynamics), and 
hence unobjectionable, the singularities do have a more problematic referential status, as we 
will see below. 
 
I will return to this in a moment, not before examining what Menon and Callender have to say 
about singularities. They note that  
 
This representation [Fig. 5.3] certainly involves a mathematical singularity: as the pressure is 
reduced, the volume of the system changes discontinuously. 
 
This is, again, rather unclear: what does ‘involves’ mean here? Where, and what, is the 
singularity in Fig. 5.3? Strictly speaking, there is no singularity there – and, just to be clear (if 
this is what they meant), none of the black dots is such a singular point. These points do mark 
(as is otherwise correctly said in their quote) states where the system is in both gas and liquid 
phases (since they belong to the horizontal coexistence line), but they have virtually nothing 
to do with genuine singularities as precisely defined in section 2, i.e., points like K in Fig. 2 
(and Fig. 3(a)), or K* in Fig. 3(b). However, if one insists to find a singularity in Fig. 5.3, I 
suppose one can perhaps say, by stretching this notion, that it is (somehow) to be identified 
not with a point, but with the whole segment in between the two black dots (including them). 
It is then this whole line that is ‘projected’ into a point like K (or K*). These are properly 
speaking singular points, appearing when we introduce the formalism of the free energy. 
 
Their next remark is also puzzling, since it mentions ‘an artifact of representation’ in relation 
to the isotherm in Fig. 5.3. (“But a closer look at how the transition takes place demonstrates 
that this is just an artifact of the representation, and not an accurate picture of what is going on 
at the transition.”) Insofar as the two black dots are not singularities, what exactly is the 
‘artifact’ here? Here is a way to clarify what they may have had in mind. We saw that when it 
comes to singularities, displaying a diagram such as the one in Fig. 5.3 is rather misleading. 
Yet, there is a sense in which one can talk about how a singularity may be regarded as an 
‘artifact of representation’. To see why and how, we need to focus on diagrams of a different 
                                                          
9 It is because of this ‘gap’, I suspect, that one may (legitimately) begin to wonder how the very idea of an 
inconsistency between the existence of discontinuities and the finiteness of the statistical mechanical system may 
arise – if the systems are finite, which they are, their volumes (for instance) can’t have discontinuities. We will 
see below that this inconsistency is only apparent. 
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kind, such as the one drawn in Fig. 4 below – which, moreover, should be examined next to 
the one in Fig. 2. In terms of what is represented in Fig. 2, it is crucial to realize that such a 
diagram, in which we see continuous curves, and their intersection (at K), is not a reflection of 
what is actually measured experimentally. For an illustration of what is measured, i.e., a direct 
plotting of the actual data-points, see Fig. 4 below.  
 
Fig. 4. An example of actual Gibbs free energy variation depending on temperature. I added the dotted circle to 
the original diagram, to be found here10: https://www.doitpoms.ac.uk/tlplib/fuel-cells/pem_efficiency.php 
(accessed 09/20/2017) 
 
The relation between Fig. 4 and Fig. 2 is as follows. Just as in Fig. 2, in Fig. 4 the system 
begins in the liquid phase, and the free energy is plotted as connecting the two square dots. As 
the temperature increases, the system transitions to the vapor (steam) phase, and the free 
energy for this phase is drawn as a continuous line connecting diamond points. The transition 
takes place at the cluster of data-points (inside the dotted circle in Fig. 4), containing steam 
states (one square point) and liquid states (two diamond points). A perhaps more precise way 
to put it is that a cluster of measurement points is taken at the transition, and from this cluster 
of data, together with the data points further away from the transition, the point of the 
transition is inferred. Crucially, no matter how good the resolution of a measurement is, i.e., 
no matter how many, and how precise additional measurement points we take in the 
laboratory (here only three are shown inside the region), the transition will still appear in the 
form of a cluster (and this is so indeed because of the unavoidability of ‘fluctuations’ that 
Menon and Callender mention, while they are noticeably absent in Fig. 5.311). It is a cluster 
like this (in Fig. 4) that is represented in idealized form in Fig. 2 as a singular point (K). Now 
                                                          
10 As is explained on the website, the data in the graph is collected for hydrogen fuel cells. The aim of the 
measurement was to see what factors influence their efficiency. The conclusion represented in the graph is that 
the energy from a fuel cell reaction decreases proportionally with the temperature at which the reaction takes 
place. In this measurement (expressed in molar quantities), the change in free energy (shown on the ordinate 
axis) is Δgf = Δhf −TΔs, where Δhf is the difference between the enthalpy hf of the products and that of the 
reactants (the same holds for entropy Δs). 
11 In his (2001, 550) Callender notes, having in mind not Fig. 5.3., but most likely something like Liu’s Figure 4 




we can see in what sense we can talk of ‘artifacts’ of representation: the singular point (i.e., K, 
or K*) doesn’t represent a physical transition point, but a cluster of data-points.12 Thus, the 
singularity is brought into existence, so to speak, or ‘manufactured’, by the way the transition 
process is represented in the formalism of free energy: as the (idealized) representation of a 
cluster, or the intersection of two curves (again, idealized as continuous). 
 
The previous discussion settles, I hope, the issue of discontinuities – there should be no 
question as to the viability of Referentialism. However, we also saw that we face yet another, 





In order to address this issue, it is useful to distinguish further between two versions of 
Referentialism: a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ form. While both versions regard singularities as 
referential, they are not referential in the same way. It is this difference that I’ll try to 
articulate below. This investigation will prompt some related remarks on the introduction of 
the infinite systems, and the non-Referentialists take on it. 
 
The strong form of Referentialism is perhaps best illustrated by an earlier paper by Batterman, 
who claims that 
 
real systems exhibit physical discontinuities . . . genuine physical discontinuities—real 
singularities in the physical system. (2005, 235-6; italics in original) 
 
It is the latter part of the quote that I will focus on now: the ideas that singularities are ‘real’, 
and that they are ‘in the physical system’. Given the remarks above (in sect. 1 and 2), there 
should be no concern about the first idea, that the singularities are real, in so far as they 
correspond to clusters of states, or regions in the graphs collecting measurement data. A 
singularity is thus real – unlike Santa Claus, and more like the center of mass of a (compact) 
physical object: a mathematical, dimensionless point, serving a well-defined theoretical 
purpose. This leads to the second idea, namely that singularities are, somehow, ‘in’ the 
physical system. This does not sound right, since we saw that the direct measurements do not 
reveal to us any such points; and, if it is the measurements that tell us what is ‘in the system’, 
then a singularity is not ‘there’. In fact, Batterman is aware of this, and acknowledges that 
 
I [did] speak [in my (2005)] rather sloppily of genuine physical singularities. It is best to think 
instead in terms of some kind of genuine qualitative change in the system at a given scale 
(2010, 22) 
 
This is now unobjectionable: such a change does take place ‘in the system’, and is surely real 
(this is the reason we are fascinated by the topic in the first place!) It is, however, concessions 
like this that open the door for a weaker form of Referentialism, whose central tenets I 
intimated (without using this label) in my (2009). I will quickly rehash the proposal here.13 In 
a nutshell, the key-thought is that a singularity refers to the phenomenon of a phase change, 
where this term is used in the sense of Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) now well-known 
distinction between data and phenomena.14 
                                                          
12 As Liu (1999, S103) correctly observed: “the transition is neither ‘smooth’ nor ‘singular’”.  
13 Part of what follows draws on Bangu (2009, sect. 5) as well as some points made in Bangu (2015). 
14 Interestingly, and perhaps not accidentally, one central example used in the 1988 paper to introduce the 




The starting point is Liu’s remarks that, according to Fig. 4, the singularities in Fig. 2 (and 
Fig. 3(a), (b)) are “artifacts” (1999, S104), “fictions of [thermodynamics],” which “do not 
exist in reality” (2001, S336). This means, presumably, that they are not observable (not 
measurable). But now, following Bogen and Woodward, we can say that Fig. 4 displays a set 
of data (points) gathered from measurements. This is, however, only the first step in the 
scientific investigation. The role of data is, next, to offer a basis for the inference to what they 
call “phenomena” (1988, 309; 311; 313, etc.)15 This inference is needed since the collected 
data points unavoidably include extraneous, distorting factors (‘noise’ – errors due to the 
impurities in the sample of substance used, or due to the fact that the measurement is always 
made away from perfect equilibrium, etc.) The key-thought here is that although measurement 
(experiment) is the most direct form of access to a physical system, it only allows this access 
in an approximate way; it does not guarantee access to the stable, enduring, characteristic 
properties of the substance of interest. The results of the inference are the phenomena; unlike 
the clusters of data points, they are not “idiosyncratic to specific experimental contexts” 
(1988, 317). Phenomena are robust, invariant over various experimental setups and, unlike the 
raw data, reproducible (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 317; 326; Woodward 2011). It is such a 
phenomenon of phase change that is displayed in Fig. 2 (and Fig. 3a, b) – while markedly 
absent in Fig. 4 (where, again, we only have data). 
 
There may be no need to insist on this, since the data/phenomena distinction is now well-
known, but before we move on it is important to keep in mind that Bogen and Woodward’s 
use of the term ‘phenomenon’ does not have the typical meaning one encounters in the 
philosophy of science literature. On one hand, data are collected from measurements 
(observations), but “phenomena for the most part cannot be observed and cannot be reported 
by observational claims” (1988, 343; 306). This use is different from that of most authors 
writing about phenomena – as precisely what is observed (sometimes with the naked eye), or 
what is to be ‘saved’ by postulating theoretical structures (planetary positions, eclipses, etc.) 
In this framework, phenomena are what generates the (always approximate, to-be-improved-
upon) sets of data; they are physically real patterns of behavior (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 
321). Yet, on the other hand, phenomena are not at the extreme end of the continuum of 
difficulty of access by instruments – according to the way I interpret the distinction here, it 
makes no sense to talk about a phenomenon as an approximation, while it is in the nature of 
data to be approximate, and, upon improving our instruments, to become more and more 
precise.16 So, when it is claimed that phenomena are “detected” (1988, 306), the qualification 
that they are “detected through the use of data” (1988, 306; my emphasis) is essential. A more 
accurate thermometer cannot (finally!) show us a phenomenon, but it would of course provide 
better data. They, in turn, would provide evidence that a genuine phenomenon exists. 
 
In my (2009), I noted that this contrast (between the robustness of phenomena and the 
transience of the data) implies a difference in what I called ‘epistemic relevance’. Data surely 
have epistemic relevance, but only secondarily; they are what is ‘shaped into’ the 
phenomena.17 It is, however, the phenomena, that possess primary epistemic relevance, due to 
                                                          
philosophers’ of science attention, eliciting both acceptance and criticism. See Woodward (2011) for, as far as I 
know, his latest restatement and defense of it.  
15 The specific inference procedures vary with the area of scientific research, but a common feature is that they 
rely on statistical techniques (1988, 311). 
16 This alludes to Norton’s insistence on approximations, to be discussed in a moment. 
17 This way of speaking is meant to emphasize that (weak) Referentialism squares remarkably well with 
Kadanoff’s remark that “in some sense, phase transitions are not exactly embedded in the finite world but, rather, 
are products of the human imagination.” (2009, 778). I submit that the sense in question here is captured 
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their robustness and replicability. It is the phenomena that are accounted for, i.e., explained, 
predicted, derived, etc., by science (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 305–306; Woodward 2000, 
S163). 
 
So, as I suggested above already, this weaker form of Referentialism appeals to the 
data/phenomena framework to illuminate the referential status of singularities. In light of the 
data/phenomena distinction, what we have in Fig. 4 is data. Yet, it is phenomena that 
constitute the focus of scientific interest – and we find them in diagrams like the one in Fig. 2. 
It is then natural to say that the role of a singularity is to refer to a phase change phenomenon 
– again, in the specific sense of Bogen and Woodward (1988), where they take a thoroughly 
realist stance on phenomena, position which, perhaps needless to say once again, I do share.18 
Thus, singularities are referential at the phenomenal/unobservable level, while not at the 
data/observable level. This characterization implies that a singularity does not refer to a 
directly ascertainable, measurable feature of the physical system (as I suspect that the strong 
form of Referentialism would have it), but to an indirect feature, introduced via a specific 
mathematical representational framework (here, in terms of free energy).  Thus, while a 
singularity lacks observational significance indeed – note the concession made to the non-
Referentialists!19 – it still retains full physical significance. 
 
Since, according to Bogen and Woodward, the scientific enterprise in general consists in 
“[moving] from claims about data to claims about phenomena” (1988, 314), and since (in this 
particular context) singularities are the (mathematical) tool to do this, i.e., to refer to 
phenomena, the mere record of scattered data points in Fig. 4 is simply the wrong place to 
look (and draw conclusions): one will not find there what physicists are actually interested to 
account for, the phenomenon of a phase change.  
 
So, let us take stock for now: the weaker from of Referentialism I am trying to articulate here 
distinguishes between phase transitions considered at the observational, or data level, on one 
hand, and phase transitions understood as phenomena on the other – and claims that 
singularities are referential in this latter sense. 
 
                                                          
precisely by understanding a phase transition as a phenomenon – whose shaping from data requires, as we saw, 
‘human imagination’, although not in an unrestrained way, but, as we also saw, in the form of mathematical 
modelling. This is perhaps an unnecessary clarification, since this ‘unrestrained way’ was surely not how 
Kadanoff intended the remark. (I should add the caveat that this is my reading of this remark, and that as far as I 
know neither Batterman, nor Kadanoff ever endorsed its interpretation along these lines.) 
18 The case for realism about phenomena is made in section VIII of their 1988 paper. 
19 In connection to this, let me note that, as a referee pointed out (and I am almost quoting the suggestion here), it 
is possible that in the above quote Norton did not mean “rapid” in a temporal sense. So, the proposal then is to 
interpret him more broadly as saying that the rate of change of a thermodynamic quantity, with respect to 
temperature, pressure, etc. is so large as to be effectively infinite. If so, there would still be wiggle room for his 
view, since after all, the very concept of a gas’ volume is well-defined only up to a certain degree of precision 
associated for example with the atomic granularity of the container walls. Then the more general lesson here 
would be that observability is problematic: physical concepts are only well-defined up to a finite margin of 
precision, and that would then seem to support the view that the strict mathematical discontinuities of the 
thermodynamic representation of the system cannot completely reflect the behavior of the real physical 
quantities, which are defined only up to a limited margin of precision. I do not discount the possibility that 
Norton meant something else by what he wrote, but I believe this rendering is a bit too charitable; it is pretty 
clear from the context that the claim should be understood in a temporal sense. And, after all, the principal sense 
of the word is, according to the Oxford dictionary, the temporal one: ‘happening in a short time’. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/rapid. Hence the remarks above don’t change the situation too much 
in my view.    
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Against this background, let me comment on how this position and distinction relate 
somewhat naturally to another distinction, drawn by Norton (2012), between what he calls – 
in connection to the infinite systems implicated in this discussion – “approximations” and 
“idealizations”. On my reading, the point of his paper is to make clear the difference between 
“two sorts of analytic activity” (2012, 228) that physicists and philosophers perform when 
studying these issues. On one hand, we can think in terms of inexactly described properties of 
real, finite systems. On the other, we may be tempted to “promote” these approximations 
(approximate descriptions) to “idealizations” (2012, 211). This is a conceptual move 
consisting first in introducing a limit physical system (i.e., an infinite system, in this case), 
and then in attempting to describe its properties. To apply this distinction here, we can say 
that the property of undergoing a phase transition is only approximated by a real, finite 
system, but will be realized exactly by the limit system.  
 
Now, this second way of thinking (in terms of the analysis of the properties of an infinite 
system) may be embraced by some physicists (and some philosophers)20; yet, as Norton 
shows (with the help of several cleverly designed examples), “the infinite systems often have 
properties very different from those of the finite system” (2012, 215). There is thus no 
guarantee “that the limit property and limit system will agree” (2012, 215), and thus “there is 
a real difficulty facing the use of the strong thermodynamic limit as an idealization. One 
cannot assume that the limit of well-behaved finite systems will be a well-behaved infinite 
system.” (2012, 216). Hence, “since an infinite system can carry unexpected and even 
contradictory properties, the latter practice [the investigation of the properties of infinite 
systems] carries considerably more risk.” (2012, 228) 
 
As the examples that Norton marshals show, this risk cannot be denied indeed – and if this 
general cautionary note is the central lesson to draw here, I am in agreement. However, one 
also gets the impression that for Norton this second ‘analytic activity’ lacks a solid epistemic 
grounding, and thus, in the end, it should be avoided. On the analysis I outlined above, it is 
perhaps clear that I do not believe that this is so. Once we see how singularities play an 
indispensable (referential) role, the introduction of the infinite system creates no conceptual 
complications. For a (weak) Referentialist, the introduction of such a system is nothing more 
than a consequence of recognizing the epistemic role of the singularity: a mathematical device 
needed to understand how a mathematical property of a certain function can be demonstrated. 
It is a mathematical way to bring a mathematical point into existence (so to speak). Thus, the 
introduction of such a system incurs no ontological commitment – if this was a serious 
concern, since, as far as I can tell, no author, physicist or philosopher, has claimed that these 
infinite systems have physical reality.  Batterman, for one, has always been clear that “fluids 
are composed of a finite number of molecules” (2006, 903; his emphasis), that “water in real 
tea kettles consists of a finite number of molecules” (2010, 7), etc. Thus, what he says about 
infinities in the context of first-order phase transitions – “I want to champion the manifestly 
outlandish proposal that despite the fact that real systems are finite, our understanding of 
them and their behavior requires, in a very strong sense, the idealization of infinite systems 
and the thermodynamic limit.” (2005, 231; my emphasis) – is in perfect harmony with the 
weak Referentialist approach proposed above. Thus, from the perspective sketched here, it is 
                                                          
20 Among physicists, Norton (2012, 219) singles out Langford (1975) and Ruelle (2004; the passage I also cited 
above). He also points out that in Le Bellac, Mortessagne, and Batrouni (2004) “any condition on an actual 
infinity of components and the corresponding behavior of that infinite system” is “conspicuously absent”. As an 
aside comment, I am not confident that this absence is the result of these authors’ deliberate choice; a perusal of 
their monograph did not convince me that they were concerned with conceptual clarity at the level Norton 
suggests they were. In fact, it is Ruelle’s treatise that seemed to me to deliberately aspire to this. 
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perhaps only the (over)enthusiastic tone that I find somewhat unwarranted. After all, 
everything here is, as one may say, business as usual. Scientists in general, as a matter of 
overarching methodological principle, want to understand (explain, derive, predict, etc.) 
phenomena – here: represented as singularities – so there is really nothing ‘outlandish’ about 
what is going on in this case: they collect the data, shape them into a phenomenon, then 
deploy the theoretical tools to account for it – which naturally leads to a mathematical 
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